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COMMENTARY
Municipal Antitrust Liability After Boulder
ANDREW W. LESTER*
On January 13, 1982, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder,' which denied home-rule charter municipalities the state ac-
tion exemption from liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 The
Court held that when a state has not specifically directed or authorized
an anticompetitive practice by a political subdivision of that state, the
political subdivision is subject to federal antitrust supervision.3 More
particularly, the mere fact that a municipality is a home-rule city pur-
suant to a provision of the state constitution is not in and of itself a
sufficient authorization by the state to remove the municipality from
antitrust scrutiny.4
Numerous predictions have been made concerning the day-to-day
effects of Boulder on the political subdivisions of the states.' Some
© 1983 Andrew W. Lester
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1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Specifically, section 1 of the Sherman Act was at issue. Section
1, in pertinent part, states: "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal . . . ." Cf. City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
3. The basics of antitrust law are beyond the scope of this discussion. Of course, these fun-
damental concepts will be important in any case involving potential antitrust liability of govern-
mental entities. For example, even if a plaintiff could show that a municipality had no state ac-
tion immunity, and had potentially violated the Sherman Act, the defendant may be able to raise
the rule of reason as a defense. Obviously, municipal attorneys will need to acquaint themselves
with the large body of antitrust law.
4. The Court stated: "Acceptance of such a proposition-that the general grant of [home-
rule] power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific an-
ticompetitive ordinances-would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and affir-
mative expression' that our precedents require." Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56. The majority
repeatedly emphasized that the grant of home-rule authority is simply a neutral statement, not
one impelling a specific course of action.
5. Justice Rehnquist, for example, introduced his dissent by stating that:
The Court's decision in this case is flawed in two serious respects, and will thereby
impede, if not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regula-
tions aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare, for fear of subjecting
the local government to liability under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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commentators have predicted catastrophe,6 while others have foreseen
business as usual. This article examines events in the realm of an-
titrust liability of political subdivisions following Boulder and makes
some predictions and recommendations concerning the future course
of events.
History of the State Action Doctrine
The leading case in the area of state protection from antitrust
liability is Parker v. Brown,8 which held that there was "nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislatures."9 Parker and its progeny formulated what
has become known as the "state action doctrine," which shields states
from exposure to certain aspects of the federal antitrust laws.
In Parker, plaintiff, a private raisin producer, sought to enjoin
numerous officials of the state of California from enforcing and ad-
ministering a marketing prorationing program pursuant to the Cali-
fornia Agricultural Prorate Act.'0 That Act, ostensibly enacted to pre-
vent waste, set up a method of categorizing raisins and setting prices
for each category.1"
For purposes of reaching its decision, the Court assumed, without
so holding, that the prorate program, if made effective solely by
private contract, combination, or conspiracy, would have violated the
Sherman Act.' Because there was no suggestion of a purpose to
restrain state action in the Sherman Act's legislative history, 3 the
Court held: "The State in adopting and enforcing the prorate program
made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in
restraint of trade or to establish a monopoly but, as sovereign,
6. "If municipalities are permitted only to enact ordinances that are consistent with the pro-
competitive policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's power to regulate the economy will be
all but destroyed .... This country's municipalities will be unable to experiment with innovative
social programs." Id. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. "The dissent's dire predictions about the consequences of the Court's holding should
therefore be viewed with skepticism." Id. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
9. Id. at 350-51.
10. California Agricultural Prorate Act of 1933, 1933 CAL. STAT. ch. 754, at 1969, as
amended, CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 59504 (West 1968).
11. For facts, see Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
12. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943). Additionally, the Court assumed "that Con-
gress could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining a stabiliza-
tion program like the present because of its effect on interstate commerce." Id.
13. "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its




imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act
did not undertake to prohibit."' 4 Although Congress may constitu-
tionally limit the powers of individual states in certain circumstances,
it did not choose to do so when it enacted the Sherman Act. Thus,
because the California Act was not private action but rather "state ac-
tion" enforcing the restraint of trade, the Sherman Act was not
violated.
For thirty years, the Supreme Court left the Parker holding virtually
untouched. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,5 however, the Court
held that because a local bar association's minimum fee schedule was
not required by a sovereign act of the state, the state action doctrine
did not apply so as to protect the bar association from antitrust
scrutiny.'6 The fact that the Virginia Bar Association provided
disciplinary measures for violations of the local minimum fee did not
suffice as state action, where the state, as sovereign, had not directed
the creation of such schedules through either legislative enactment or
state supreme court rule.'
7
Then, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,8 the Court stated that
private anticompetitive activities may not be sheltered from antitrust
liability under the state action doctrine by mere acquiescence in the ac-
tivities by the state. ' 9 In Cantor, the state Public Utilities Commission
had approved certain tariffs under which the defendant was to provide
light bulbs to its customers free of charge.20 Because the state had not
14. Id. at 352.
15. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. "It is not enough that, as the County Bar puts it, anti-competitive conduct is 'prompted'
by the state action; rather, anti-competitive activities must be compelled by direction of the State
acting as sovereign." Id. at 791.
17. "The State Bar, by providing that deviation from County bar minimum fees may lead to
disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity,
and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act." Id. at 791-92.
18. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
19. Id. at 598. The Court noted:
The mere possibility of conflict between state regulatory policy and federal anti-
trust policy is an insufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal an-
titrust laws. Congress could hardly have intended state regulatory agencies to have
broader power than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from the antitrust
laws. Therefore, assuming that there are situations in which the existence of state
regulation should give rise to an implied exemption, the standards for ascertaining
the existence and scope of such an exemption surely must be at least as severe as
those applied to federal regulatory legislation.
Id. at 596-97. The majority held: "IN]either Michigan's approval of the tariff filed by respon-
dent, nor the fact that the lamp-exchange program may not be terminated until a new tariff is
filed, is a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that pro-
gram." Id. at 598.
20. For facts, see id. at 582-85.
1983]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
affirmatively directed the no-cost distribution of light bulbs, the
private entity could be found subject to antitrust liability. 2
The next year, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,22 the Court held
that a mandatory ban on attorney advertising, which had been
adopted and enforced by the Arizona Supreme Court, constituted
state action under Parker.23 The Court unanimously found that "the
state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the
State's supervision is so active" as to preclude antitrust liability2 4
Nevertheless, the ban was found to be unenforceable as violative of
the first amendment.25
In 1978 the Court altered the Parker doctrine. In City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,26 Justice Brennan achieved majority
support for the proposition that a city, when acting as an owner and
provider of services, acts as a private, profit-making business entity
for the purposes of the Sherman Act.27 But when Justice Brennan
wrote that the essential distinction between Lafayette and Parker was
that Lafayette involved a political subdivision of a state, and not the
state itself, he could only attract the votes of three other Justices.28
Brennan stated that when the state has not directed the anticompetitive
activity of the political subdivision, the state action doctrine does not
apply.
29
The swing vote proved to be that of Chief Justice Burger, who em-
phasized the proprietary nature of the activities conducted by the
municipality." If the activity complained of is not governmental, the
21. "Accordingly, even though there may be cases in which the State's participation in a
decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for his con-
duct in implementing it, this record discloses no such unfairness." Id. at 594-95.
22. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
23. "The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to
professional behavior. Moreover . . . the rules are subject to pointed re-examination by the
policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in enforcement proceedings." Id. at 362.
24. Id. at 362.
25. Id. at 381-82.
26. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens,
wrote the plurality opinion. The Chief Justice concurred in the judgment and joined Part I of
the plurality opinion. Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun dissented.
27. Both the plurality, id. at 407-08, and the Chief Justice, id. at 424-25 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring), agreed on this point.
28. "Plainly petitioners are in error in arguing that Parker held that all governmental en-
tities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a State, are, simply by reason of their status as
such, exempt from the antitrust laws." Id. at 408.
29. "[W]hen the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the
State's subdivisions in exercising their delegated power must obey the antitrust laws." Id. at 416.
30. "This case turns, or ought to, on the District Court's explicit conclusion, unchallenged
here, that '[t]hese plaintiff cities are engaging in what is clearly a business activity; activity in




Chief Justice argued, the Parker holding would not preclude examina-
tion of the activity for antitrust liability.31 In Lafayette, therefore, the
Chief Justice urged the Court to remand for a determination of
whether the city's activities -were governmental or proprietary.2
While the Supreme Court held that proprietary activities of a
governmental entity of a state were subject to antitrust scrutiny, the
procedural posture of Lafayette precluded a holding that the specific
activities forming the subject matter of the complaint were pro-
prietary." Nevertheless, the Court opened the door in Lafayette, per-
mitting complaints to be brought against municipalities based upon the
Sherman Act.
The Court also held in 1978 that a state statutory scheme that in-
hibited competition may nonetheless be protected from antitrust
scrutiny by the state action doctrine.4 The state regulation in question
gave to the California New Motor Vehicle Board the power to approve
or disapprove the opening of a dealership within a market area con-
taining an existing dealership. Because the regulation embodied a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to permit
existing dealers an opportunity to present a claim of injurious competi-
tion, the Court would not allow examination of the activities for anti-
trust violations."
31. Burger believes that "the running of a business enterprise is not an integral operation in
the area of tradional government functions." Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In both
Lafayette and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that state
governmental activities, within the meaning of the tenth amendment, could not be regulated by
Congress under its commerce clause power), Burger identified the nature of the challenged ac-
tivity as the crucial issue.
32. Burger cited Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596 (1976) for the proposition
that "[t]here is no logical inconsistency between requiring such a firm to meet regulatory criteria
insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly powers and also to comply with antitrust stan-
dards to the extent that it engages in business activity in competitive areas of the economy." City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 425 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring).
33. The four dissenters in Lafayette emphasized that a municipality is itself a governmental
subdivision of the state. Justice Stewart stated: "[T]he plurality today blurs, if indeed it does not
erase, this logical distinction between private and governmental action . . . . [Ilt is senseless to
require a showing of state compulsion when the State itself acts through one of its governmental
subdivisions." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 431-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent
indicated disagreement with the proprietary/governmental dichotomy raised by the Chief
Justice.
34. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
35. The dispositive answer is that the Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme is
a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to
displace unfettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and reloca-
tion of automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the
antitrust laws under the "state action" exemption.
Id. at 109.
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Breaking with what had become an annual tradition of revising
Parker, the Court waited until 1980 before handing down its next state
action doctrine decision. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc.,36 the Court again held that in order
for antitrust immunity to adhere to a regulatory plan, the restraint
must be one that is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy." 37 Additionally, the restraint must be actively supervised
by the state.8
In summary, the state action doctrine shields states from certain
types of liability under the federal antitrust laws." Furthermore, the
state action doctrine extends certain immunities to those persons who
are acting pursuant to a clearly defined state policy in a manner that
would otherwise subject that person to scrutiny under congressional
antitrust enactments.0
The Boulder Holding
In Boulder the Court considered the question of whether the
municipal regulatory activity regarding cable television "constitutes
the action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity [or]
constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. . .. "4'
From the city of Boulder's viewpoint, the Court answered unfavora-
bly.
The city of Boulder derived its home-rule authority from the Col-
orado home-rule amendment to the state constitution.42 In 1979 the
City Council of Boulder enacted an emergency ordinance that pro-
hibited the cable television company then operating within the city
from expanding its coverage to additional quarters of Boulder. The
purpose of the ordinance was to allow competitors an opportunity to
enter the market.4 3
Plaintiff-petitioner, the original cable television franchise holder in
36. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
37. Id. at 105, quoting from Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410.
38. California Retail Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Alum., Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). Further-
more, the Court stated that "[t]he national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by
casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement." Id. at 106.
39. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
40. But see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
41. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982).
42. COLO. CONST., art. XX, § 6, which provides in part: "It is the intention of this article to
grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of
self-government in both local and municipal matters . ..




Boulder, filed an action against the city seeking injunctive relief under
section 1 of the Sherman Act."' The district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction. Petitioner sought certiorari from the reversal of that
decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.5
In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the majority held
that the city of Boulder's status as a home rule city did not in and of
itself shield it from antitrust scrutiny, because the state constitutional
provision permitting home rule provided no clear articulation or affir-
mative expression by the state of a precise policy."6 Thus, the majority
stated: "A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive ac-
tions for which municipal liability is sought .... The relationship of
the State of Colorado to Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one of
precise neutrality."47
The majority denied that municipalities would be inhibited from
fulfilling governmental duties, stating that the holding "means only
that when the State itself has not directed or authorized an anti-
competitive practice, the State's subdivisions in exercising their
delegated power must obey the antitrust laws."" Thus, the Court held
that cities are exempt from antitrust liability only insofar as the state
specifically provides.
In a strong and vociferous dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, argued that the Court misinter-
preted the Parker doctrine as an exemption rather than as a preemp-
tion. By calling the state action doctrine an exemption of states from
coverage under the antitrust laws, the Court was in essence finding
that the Sherman Act is limited in its coverage to other than state-
directed activities. According to the dissent, however: "The question
addressed in Parker and in this case is not whether State and local
governments are exempt from the Sherman Act, but whether statutes,
ordinances, and regulations enacted as an act of government are pre-
empted by the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy
Clause."4
The difference between an exemption and a preemption is subtle,
albeit significant. If Parker concerns an issue of preemption, the ques-
tion is whether Congress has taken the opportunity to occupy the area
of regulation concerned, thereby rendering any state or local enact-
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
45. For the procedural posture, see Boulder, 455 U.S. at 46-48.
46. Id. at 55.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 57, quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416.
49. 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
19831
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ments ineffective.50 If, on the other hand, the issue is one of exemp-
tion, the question is whether Congress has affirmatively exempted
specific activities from coverage under its own legislative enactments."'
If a preemption were indeed the issue in Boulder, the judgment of the
Tenth Circuit should have been affirmed.
The reasoning of the dissent is clearly correct. In Parker, the Court
noted in dicta: "In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may con-
stitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress."5s2 As the dissent in Boulder aptly stated,
"This is clearly the language of federal pre-emption under the
Supremacy Clause." 3 The point made in Parker is that Congress had
enacted no affirmative proscription; Congress simply did not intend to
preempt the state legislation that was under scrutiny in that case.
Despite the accurate portrayal of the exemption/preemption dichotomy
by the dissent, however, the majority indelibly labels the state action
doctrine as an exemption.
4
Boulder and Federalism
The dissenters also argued that the majority improperly "treats a
political subdivision of a State as an entity indistinguishable from any
privately owned business.' 5 The Court countered that a municipality,
unlike a state, is not a sovereign entity, and therefore is not entitled to
the treatment afforded a state.5 6
Thus, the majority concluded that cities, because they are not states,
are not a recognized part of the federal system. What the Court essen-
50. We are confronted with questions under the Supremacy Clause when we are called
upon to resolve a purported conflict between the enactments of the Federal
Government and those of a state or local government, or where it is claimed that
the Federal Government has occupied a particular field exclusively, so as to
foreclose any state regulation. Where preemption is found, the state enactment
must fall without any effort to accommodate the state's purposes or interests.
Id. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. "[E]xemption involves the interplay between the enactments of a single sovereign-
whether one enactment was intended by Congress to relieve a party from the necessity of com-
plying with a prior enactment." Id. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
53. 455 U.S. at 63.
54. In New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), the Court referred
to the Parker doctrine as the " 'state action' exemption." Id. at 109 (emphasis added). Yet, even
though the state action doctrine was so labeled, the analysis of the dissent in Boulder on this
point seems correct.
55. 455 U.S. at 60.




tially held is that political subdivisions have no standing to argue that
home-rule authority gives them, for federalism purposes, the sover-
eignty of the state.
The holding of Boulder makes evident that a municipality will not
be treated for federalism purposes as a state unless there is a precise
and affirmative direction from the state to that effect. In the first
place, the Court noted that actions of cities are not in and of
themselves state action. The majority then held that the general home-
rule authority granted to the city of Boulder, as well as to other cities
throughout the United States,"1 was not a "clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy.""8 Home rule, the Court stated,
does not create an affirmative directive, but rather a statement of
"mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as an-
ticompetitive."'9 Because no specific state action is involved, no
deference needs to be given to the actions of municipalities taken pur-
suant to the city's home-rule powers. The state action doctrine simply
does not apply. Thus, for federalism purposes, the concept of home
rule has almost no meaning.
Despite statements to the contrary, the opinion of the Court deeply
affects concepts of federalism. As the dissent notes, "notions of
federalism are implicated when it is contended that a municipal or-
dinance is pre-empted by a federal statute."' 6 Indeed, almost half of
the fifty states sought to regain previously lost control over home-rule
localities by filing briefs as amici curiae against the position of the city
of Boulder.6' This turn of events graphically illustrates that there is a
twofold analysis upon which one must embark when studying issues of
federalism, namely: (1) Does the question involve a state or a political
subdivision of a state, and (2) if the issue concerns a political subdivi-
sion, has the state specifically directed the municipality to act in a cer-
tain manner? If the latter question is applicable and answered in the
negative, no federalism argument can be made.2
Although it is true, as the Court holds, that cities are not in and of
themselves sovereign, it nevertheless appears that states have the power
57. The decision in Boulder was not limited to its facts. Rather, it was meant to apply across
the board to home-rule cities. Some have suggested that perhaps Boulder only applies to charter
cities that derive their authority from certain types of constitutional provisions. A full analysis of
Boulder, however, makes manifest that the Court did not intend to create such a distinction.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id. at 55 (emphasis by the Court).
60. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 71 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. See generally Kennedy & Lester, The Future of Federalism: A Report on the Legal and
Political Activities of 1982 As They Affected Federalism and Their Implications, 53 OKLA. B.J.
3079 (Dec. 31, 1982).
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to give to their political subdivisions a measure of their sovereignty.
The question is how the state passes on that sovereignty. Protestations
of the dissent notwithstanding, it is now apparent that the state policy
may not be a general grant of the power of the state. Rather, it must
be affirmatively expressed and clearly articulated.63
Boulder Questions Unanswered
Left unanswered by Boulder is the extent of potential liability for a
political subdivision. In the final footnote of its opinion, the Court
stated that it "do[es] not confront the issue of remedies appropriate
against municipal officials." ' 6 The Court also stated that "[i]t may be
that certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive when
engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when
adopted by a local government.
' 65
Apparently this limitation assured the majority of the necessary fifth
vote, namely that of Justice Stevens." In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens emphasized that the majority had not decided that
there had been a violation of the Sherman Act, but simply that home-
rule municipalities may be found liable thereunder. The concurring
opinion indicates that such liability will rarely be found. Furthermore,
the concurrence and the majority make apparent that the Court will at
least attempt to limit the types of activities that could give rise to
municipal antitrust liability. 7
63. Indeed, the main purpose of the home-rule movement is to allow cities to act instead of
the state in purely municipal matters. The state retains power to overrule charter cities in matters
of statewide concern. It seems logical that the state, by permitting home rule itself, passes its
sovereignty to the city insofar as the city acts on purely municipal concerns.
64. 455 U.S. at 57 n.20. In what is perhaps the most strongly worded criticism of the
majority opinion, the dissent states: "It will take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics to
conclude that municipalities are not subject to treble damages to compensate any person 'injured
in his business or property.' " Id. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 57 n.20, quoting from 435 U.S. at 417 n.48. Rehnquist believes the most disturbing
part of the Court's opinion is that portion which leaves open the possibility that a different stan-
dard would be applied to municipalities. For example, he writes:
If the Rule of Reason were "modified" to permit a municipality to defend its
regulation on the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its an-
ticompetitive effects, the courts will be called upon to review social legislation in a
manner reminiscent of the Lochner era. Once again, the federal courts will be
called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry in-
to the reasonableness of local regulation that this Court has properly rejected.
455 U.S at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 58-60. Because Justice Blackmun had dissented in Lafayette, some might argue
that he provided the fifth vote. Yet, Stevens's concurring opinion indicates a certain lack of ease
on his part with the prospect of municipal antitrust liability.
67. When such issues arise before the Court, it will be interesting to see whether the three
dissenters in Boulder will vote to limit liability or to limit the situations in which municipal an-




In summary, political subdivisions of a state may be held liable for
violations of federal antitrust statutes. They are not protected by the
Parker state action exemption unless the activities that form the sub-
ject matter of the complaint constitute the action of the state in its
sovereign capacity or unless such activities further or implement a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. The state
policy cannot merely consist of a general grant of state power, nor can
it consist of state neutrality. Rather, the state must have directed the
activity. Nevertheless, the Court also indicated in Boulder that it
would not hold cities to the same standard of conduct as is prescribed
for private business entities.6"
The dissent strongly countered that Parker concerned an issue of
preemption, not of exemption.69 It further implied that the dichotomy
forged by the majority between states and their political subdivisions
was more imagined than real."° Finally, the dissent intimated that the
Court's decision may cause drastic consequences for local governmen-
tal bodies.71 Despite the persuasive arguments of the dissent, the opi-
nion drafted by Justice Brennan subjecting municipalities to antitrust
scrutiny stands as the holding of the Court.
Post-Boulder Cases
Since the Court handed down its decision in Boulder, several lower
courts have had the opportunity to review factual situations giving rise
to Boulder-type issues. One case directly on point is Pueblo Aircraft
Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo," which, like Boulder, concerned the
potential liability of a constitutionally created home-rule municipality
under the Sherman Act."
The plaintiff in Pueblo had been a fixed base operator (aircraft ser-
vice and sales) at the municipally owned and operated airport. When
the lease agreement between the parties was due to expire, the city
solicited bids from the public. Plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder, was
forced to quit the premises."
On appeal from the dismissal of the complaint, the Tenth Circuit
68. 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.
69. Id. at 60.
70. Id. at 68-70.
71. Id. at 67.
72. 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 762 (1983). Pueblo was decided by
the same court that had handed down the decision overturned by the Supreme Court in Boulder.
73. The sections at issue here were 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14 (1976).
74. Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 806, 807.
75. 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1981).
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Court of Appeals considered the posture of the case in light of
Boulder. The issue, as phrased by the court, was "whether the State of
Colorado by affirmative legislative action granted City an exemption
from operation of federal antitrust laws by virtue of [certain] statutory
language .... "I The pertinent provision of the Colorado statute pro-
vided that municipal airports are owned and operated as "public
governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of
public necessity . ... "I'
The court found the city to be exempt from federal antitrust liabil-
ity, reasoning that the activities that formed the substance of the com-
plaint constituted the action of the state of Colorado itself" and, in
any event, furthered a clearly articulated policy of the state. Stating
that the applicable statute made the operation of the airport a govern-
mental, as opposed to a proprietary, function of the city,79 the Tenth
Circuit held that Pueblo was merely implementing a legislative direc-
tive. Thus, the state of Colorado had extended its exemption from an-
titrust scrutiny to its political subdivisions as concerns the operation of
municipal airports.
The essence of Pueblo is that the Tenth Circuit is rather reluctant to
find liability against a municipality under the Sherman Act. Basically,
the court sent the message that it thought little of the majority opinion
in Boulder. The Colorado statute in question, though certainly ex-
pressing a state policy, 0 is hardly of a precatory nature." Never-
theless, the court found that the statutory language fully shielded the
political subdivision with the antitrust exemption possessed by the
state. Although the court recognized that Boulder mandates the
scrutiny of a state's political subdivisions for potential antitrust
liability, the opinion likewise makes evident that the Tenth Circuit will
76. 679 F.2d at 809.
77. COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973).
78. "In its 'governmental capacity' a municipality acts as an arm of the state for the public
good on behalf of the state rather than itself." 679 F.2d at 810.
79. Thus, the Court noted that "[in the absence of an express statutory direction, such as
that contained in C.R.S. 1973 § 41-4-101, supra, the operation of a municipal airport is generally
regarded as a proprietary function rather than a governmental function." Id. at 810, 811.
80. Cf. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
pertinent state enabling legislation need not compel the anticompetitive activity, but may merely
be a general authorization, where a traditionally municipal function is involved).
81. Cf. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, No. C78-1733A, C78-65A (N.D. Ohio 1983),
in which the court applied the state action immunity because "the legislature contemplated the
use of anti-competitive measures" by political subdivisions. Slip op. at 18. The district court was
hearing this case for the second time; the Supreme Court had remanded it for decision in light of




give every advantage allowable pursuant to Boulder to the municipali-
ty seeking an antitrust exemption.2
Perhaps the most widely publicized holding concerning municipal
antitrust liability since Boulder was handed down by the Fifth Circuit
on March 17, 1983. In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,
8 3
the court held that the Houston plan for dividing the city among
numerous cable television (CATV) franchises constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Affiliated Capital represents the first in-
stance in which a federal court has held a city official personally liable
for money damages for an antitrust violation.
In 1977 the city of Houston received a number of unsolicited bids
for a cable television franchise. Mayor Jim McConn, in order to ease
the political pressures and in order to give several applicants a fran-
chise, impelled four applicants to work together to decide among
themselves (1) how the city should be divided into separate markets,
and (2) which applicant should obtain a franchise in each of the dif-
ferent sectors. After the process had begun, the mayor further insisted
that another group, led by his personal attorney, be added t6 the pool.
Any plan devised by these cable television companies would require
the approval of the Houston City Council before it could become ef-
fective.
Plaintiff, which until September, 1978, had been barred by federal
regulation from operating a CATV company, applied for a franchise
after the others had made the agreement, but prior to the Council's
approval thereof. When the City Council accepted the plan put forth
by the other five applicants, plaintiff sought legal and equitable relief
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The district court entered a judgment non obstante veredicto in
favor of the defendants. The jury, in response to interrogatories sub-
mitted to it, had indicated that plaintiff had suffered damages in the
amount of $2.1 million. Nevertheless, the district court thought that
the responses to the other interrogatories did not support the jury's
assessment of liability. 4 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed in a two-
to-one decision, reinstating the jury verdict.85
The majority found that the agreement among competing CATV
companies constituted a traditional horizontal market division, a per
82. Instead of merely relying upon the Colorado home-rule provision, as in Boulder, the
Tenth Circuit in Pueblo used specific statutory authority. Of course, it came to the same conclu-
sion as it had reached in the prior case.
83. 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983). In an interesting turn of events, the Fifth Circuit has agreed
to a rehearing en banc. 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983).
84. 519 F. Supp. 991, 997 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
85. 700 F.2d 226, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).
1983]
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se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Additionally, the court
found that the actions of the mayor in securing the agreement con-
stituted involvement in a conspiracy, thereby likewise subjecting Mc-
Conn to liability for treble damages." The dissent noted that the ma-
jority relied substantially upon one expert's testimony in reaching its
conclusion. Chief Judge Clark's basic disagreement with the majority
rested in his belief that the court should examine the challenged ac-
tivities under the rule of reason instead of following a per se analysis.7
Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent cited Boulder. It is
particularly remarkable that the dissent did not cite Boulder for the
proposition that money damages may not be available against city of-
ficials.
There are two possible interpretations of Affiliated Capital. The
first explains that decision as an indication that the Fifth Circuit is
more than willing to assess money damages against municipalities and
their officers and employees in antitrust cases. The more probable in-
terpretation states an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.8
When corhpared with other recent decisions,9 a theory is apparently
emerging that basically examines whether the governmental action
being attacked was taken in a seemingly corrupt manner. If "dealing"
appears to have been a major concern, courts will be more likely to
impose antitrust liability.90
Conducting government in an open, clean manner should substan-
tially reduce exposure of cities to antitrust liability. Avoiding the ap-
pearance of collaboration with an interested party will help. Acting in
86. Id. at 237.
87. Id. at 238.
88. Noerr-Pennington precludes antitrust liability for lobbying and other joint efforts of
private individuals or entities to obtain legislation or other governmental action. The doctrine
essentially is based upon the first amendment. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
89. Cf. Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982).
That opinion reversed the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants on various
issues, including both a § 1983 and an antitrust claim. Summary judgment is granted sparingly in
such cases. Thus, the result should not have been altogether unexpected. In the Noerr-
Pennington portion of its opinion, the court said that any "legitimate lobbying efforts may have
been accompanied by illegal or fraudulent actions [on the part of city officials.]" Id. at 746.
Because there was a genuine issue as to a material fact, the court felt constrained to reverse the
decision of the trial court.
90. Whether the theory is the so-called "co-conspirator exception" to Noerr-Pennington is
certainly open to debate. Compare Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) and
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983) with Metro Cable Co.
v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) and Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of





a "governmental" manner appears to be one of the keys. The Fifth
Circuit, however, did not so limit its decision. Actually, the court
seemed to downplay the significance of McConn's dealing, instead em-
phasizing the mayor's apparent abandonment of the power to conduct
traditional governmental functions to private parties.9 ' All of these
factors, taken together, indicate that courts will attempt to assure
through the Sherman Act that governments act governmentally.
One case concerning a different type of political subdivision of a
state pointed out several issues involved in post-Boulder types of con-
troversies.2 The plaintiff in Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona3 failed to
gain admission to the Arizona Bar. Specifically, Ronwin alleged that
the Bar merely admitted a pre-set number of applicants, thereby
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.94 The district court dismissed
the action as to all defendants for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.95 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as to the
individual members of the admissions committee.9 6
Noting the standard of state involvement called for in Boulder, the
Court contrasted the facts before it with the situation involved in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona.9 7 In Bates, the Arizona Supreme Court had
adopted the rule which the Bar at that time sought to enforce,98 and
thereby exempted the Bar from Sherman Act antitrust scrutiny under
the state action doctrine. In Ronwin, however, the Arizona high court
had neither adopted nor directly authorized the alleged policy.99
91. Thus, the court stated that "ji]nstead of following this common practice [of soliciting
bids] the city simply passively accepted applications as they arrived .... Mayor McConn had let
it be known that he did not want to choose between competing applicants. He wanted the ap-
plicants to work together, resolve any overlaps in their territories and present him with a finished
product. He abdicated his responsibility in the franchising process to a group of powerful
Houston businessmen." Affiliated Capital v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added).
92. That Boulder applies not only to cities but also to other political subdivisions of a state
demonstrates that the twenty-two states that filed briefs in Boulder against the position of the
city may have been unwise. While states have regained a measure of lost power at the expense of
cities, they may have surrendered much to the federal government.
93. 686 F.2d 692, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this
case. Hoover v. Ronwin, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983). The outcome of Hoover may have a significant
impact on licensing procedures for attorneys. See Browning, Fail the Bar, Sue the Examiners, 69
A.B.A.J. 1656 (Nov. 1982).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 695.
96. Id. at 694. The court affirmed as to the Bar itself since there were no allegations of
wrongdoing against the Bar. Id. at 694 n.l.
97. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
98. That rule restricted attorney advertising.
99. Because of the procedural posture of Ronwin, plaintiff had yet to prove that the policy
in fact existed.
19831
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
That the Arizona Supreme Court had delegated to the Bar the
general authority to administer membership examinations was insuffi-
cient to constitute a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
state policy.100 In any event, there was no active supervision by the
state. Thus, the court held that Ronwin should have the opportunity
to obtain scrutiny of the challenged actions under the Sherman Act.'0 I
Two other decisions of interest considered allegations of govern-
mental antitrust liability in light of Boulder. In Allied Artists Picture
Corp. v. Rhodes,02 the court found that a blind bidding requirement
of state law compelled governmental action and therefore could not
give rise to antitrust scrutiny. Likewise, in Jackson v. Taylor,03 the
court dismissed a complaint brought by prisoners alleging Sherman
Act violations by prison officials in fixing a price of twenty-five cents
for local telephone calls. The district court noted that, while "govern-
mental agencies are not immune from antitrust laws simply because
they are governmental agencies,'01 4 the regulation of prisons, in-
cluding the setting of a fee for local telephone calls, was a governmen-
tal function and therefore exempt from scrutiny.'0 5
There appears to be a split among federal courts as to the proper in-
terpretation of Boulder. Whereas the Ninth Circuit interpreted
Boulder relatively strictly against the political subdivision, the Tenth
Circuit gave the city of Pueblo every benefit conceivable. On the other
hand, some courts apparently will place heavy emphasis upon the
distinction between a governmental and a proprietary function.
Because of the decision in Boulder, municipalities, as well as other
political subdivisions of states, potentially face a myriad of claims of
antitrust violations. Actually, it is difficult to imagine what activities
are not potentially the subject of such scrutiny. Licensing requirements
are prime objects for challenge as restricting competition.'0 6 Likewise,
other types of occupational regulation will be attacked.07 Municipal
100. Delegating to the Bar the power to administer the entrance examination is analogous to
the delegation of general home-rule authority. In order to have shielded the Bar from antitrust
scrutiny, the state should have directed that the Bar enforce a policy of admitting only a
predetermined number of bar applicants. See Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 695
(9th Cir. 1981).
101. Of course, plaintiff still would have to show the very existence of the challenged ac-
tivities.
102. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
103. 539 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1982).
104. Id. at 595.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981).
107. It is not difficult to imagine numerous possible complaints. For example, a disgruntled




operation of entities to the exclusion of competitors from the private
sector will be challenged as anticompetitive.'°s Examples of such
operations include airports,109 stadiums,"10 transit systems,"' sewer
services,"2 trash collection,"'3 electrical works" 4 and other utilities.'
Cable television'16 and other franchising"7 arrangements will likewise
face antitrust scrutiny. Methods of procurement for municipalities will
be screened."8 Perhaps of greatest importance, Boulder will provide
yet another method for challenging zoning restrictions."9
Decisions of other political subdivisions will also be subjected to in-
creasing challenge.' Thus quasi-public agencies, such as bar associa-
tions operating only under a general mandate, must be prepared to
defend against claims arising under Boulder. Simply stated, Boulder
will tend to cause an ever-increasing number of cases to be filed
against public bodies.
Boulder Reconsidered
The problem Boulder creates is that it potentially subjects govern-
mental entities to a large number of substantial claims, thereby causing
those entities to expend ever-increasing sums of limited funds to de-
fend against those actions. Boulder may have the same type of impact
108. See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982);
City of Mishawka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, reh. denied,
450 U.S. 960 (1981).
109. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Pinehurst
Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Serv., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
110. See, e.g., Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 556 F. Supp. 664
(S.D. Ohio 1983).
111. See, e.g., Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
112. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983).
113. Heille v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982); Central Iowa Refuse Systems,
Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 557 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
114. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
115. See, e.g., Community Builders, Inc. v. Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981).
116. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Af-
filiated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983); Omega Satellite Prod.
Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Catalina Cablevision Assoc. v. City of
Tucson, Civ. No. 82-459 (D. Ariz. 1983).
117. See, e.g., Golden State Transit v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
118. See, e.g., Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Security
Fire Door Co. v. Los Angeles, 484 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1973).
119. See, e.g., Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.
1982); Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
120. See, e.g., Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981).
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that Monroe v. Pape121 has had over the past two decades in the area
of litigation under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. While in 1961, the
year in which Monroe v. Pape was decided, only a handful of cases
were filed annually against governmental bodies and their employees
under the Civil Rights Act, the number now is in the many thousands.
Likewise, antitrust actions against municipalities will surely multiply.
Parties aggrieved by municipal actions may be tempted to seek
satisfaction through Sherman Act claims based upon some exception
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Especially in this sense, Boulder
may come to be regarded as yet another weapon with which to
threaten public bodies. If cases such as Affiliated Capital will en-
courage municipalities to operate in an open, clean manner, such an
exception could have desirable effects.
The dissent in Boulder, however, aptly states the impracticality of
treating a municipality in a like manner as a business entity. 22 To
counter that argument, the majority hints that it might view at least
certain municipal actions in a different light. Remaining unanswered,
however, is how such a judicial policy would be accomplished.
Significantly, the Court states: "We hold today only that the Parker
v. Brown exemption was no bar to the District Court's grant of injunc-
tive relief .... Moreover, as in [Lafayette], we do not confront the
issue of remedies appropriate against municipal officials." '23 Thus, the
Court has yet to determine whether a court may hold political subdivi-
sions liable for money damages. Furthermore, even if money damages
are available, the Court has not stated whether treble damages may be
had. 2
4
Additionally, the Boulder Court indicated that a different set of
121. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
122. By treating the municipal defendant as no different from the private litigant at-
tempting to invoke the Parker doctrine, the Court's decision today will radically
alter the relationship between the States and their political subdivisions.
Municipalities will no longer be able to regulate the local economy without the im-
primatur of a clearly expressed state policy to displace competition.
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 70-71. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 56-57 n.20.
124. In order to rebuff a treble damages claim, a municipality should consider a line of
reasoning that compares the claim to that of City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981). In Fact Concerts, the Court held that municipalities were not subject to punitive
damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Reasoning that the common law did not allow such
damages against cities, the Court stated that section 1983, by not specifically providing for such
damages, indicated a congressional intention not to change that standard. Obviously, however,
the comparison is by no means perfect. When it enacted the antitrust laws, Congress surely did
not intend that cities be liable for treble damages. Nevertheless, Congress plainly intended that
treble damages be an integral part of private enforcement actions. But cf. Affiliated Capital




substantive rules may apply when the federal antitrust laws subject
political subdivisions to scrutiny.2 ' The obvious hesitancy of the
Court explicitly to hold that a municipality has violated the Sherman
Act' 6 may be a key factor in limiting the effects of Boulder.'27
Local governing bodies will nonetheless face increasing numbers of
challenges under the Boulder doctrine. Unsuccessful bidders will
charge collusion. Those who fall licensing examinations will claim
both a violation of their civil rights and a violation of antitrust
statutes. Those whose rezoning applications are denied will challenge
the denial as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, especially
where there is even a hint of political dealing. In essence, cities will
have to defend, under threat of treble damages, against numerous new
charges of violations of some type of right.
The number of frivolous claims will, in all likelihood, increase. Ron-
win v. State Bar of Arizona simultaneously points out both the poten-
tial dangers as well as the limitations of Boulder. Ronwin simply holds
that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to present evidence
that might establish an antitrust violation.'28 The Ninth Circuit,
however, expressed marked skepticism about plaintiff's prospects for
success.'29 Likewise, Jackson v. Taylor illustrates the kinds of
trivialities that will be brought against cities in federal court.3 0 Thus,
the problem is that political subdivisions will be forced to spend in-
creasing amounts of time and resources defending such suits.
Despite recent attempts to restrict antitrust analysis to economic
matters,' antitrust law tends to embody populistic notions. When
analyzing municipal activities under Boulder, notions of good govern-
ment may be relevant. Thus, a showing that the challenged activities
were conducted for the health, safety, and welfare of the community,
125. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.
126. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine exactly how the city of Boulder could have violated the
Sherman Act, given the facts of that case. Construing Boulder's actions as anticompetitive
would take a feat of "judicial gymnastics." Boulder, 455 U.S. at 40 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). See supra note 64.
127. Municipalities should argue that activities such as licensing and franchising are the
substance of which local governments consist and for which local governments operate.
128. Thus, the Court stated that "Ronwin should not have been denied the opportunity to
prove that the grading policy was designed to limit competition among Arizona attorneys, as op-
posed to being designed to ensure that attorneys had the necessary qualifications." See Ronwin
v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1981).
129. See, e.g., id. at 700 n.9.
130. Jackson v. Taylor, 539 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1982). Since Boulder most of the municipal
antitrust decisions have concerned the appropriateness of some type of pretrial disposition of the
case. Although the frequency of successful complaints may be minimal, cities will have to devote
substantial funding to the defense of antitrust actions.
131. Cf. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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and not simply as an expedient political solution or as a means of
benefiting the friends of those in power, may be vital to the ultimate
success of the defense of Boulder claims.
Largely overlooked, but perhaps the most unsettling aspect of
Boulder, is its effect on issues of federalism. Basically, the Court has
stripped home-rule cities of standing for federalism purposes. The
means of rescue for municipalities from the federalism implications of
Boulder may arrive through the distinction between an exemption and
a preemption. Should the Court have second thoughts about its
opinion, it could pursue a line of cases distinguishing Boulder as con-
cerning an issue of exemption rather than preemption. Of course, in
order for the Court to so restrict Boulder, it would have to embark
upon the difficult task of establishing that differentiation after having
specifically blurred any distinctions.'
3 2
Whether the effect of the Court's holding turns out to be the
destruction of "the 'home rule' movement in this country . . .
remains to be seen. Obviously, however, Boulder has dealt a serious
blow to the status of home-rule charter cities. Additionally, it has
caused a serious diminution in the power of a municipality as com-
pared to the state.
Conclusion
In Boulder, the Supreme Court held that the state action doctrine
espoused forty years earlier in Parker v. Brown134 does not protect
political subdivisions of states from scrutiny for violations of federal
antitrust regulations. The Court stated that a municipality is not ex-
empt from antitrust liability unless the subject activities constitute the
action of the state in its sovereign capacity or the activities further or
implement a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy.' 3 Though allowing a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief, the
Court nevertheless would not comment on whether money damages
against municipalities are appropriate.'36 Furthermore, the Court in-
dicated that activities that might subject a private entity to antitrust
liability might be viewed in a different light when conducted by a
political subdivision.'
37
132. See generally Kennedy & Lester, supra note 62.
133. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 47-48.
134. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
135. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71,
136. Id. at 56 n.20. But cf. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th
Cir. 1983).




In a strongly worded dissent, three Justices maintained that the state
action doctrine concerned an issue of preemption, not exemption. If
the question is one of preemption, so the dissent argues, it becomes
evident that Congress never affirmatively preempted state and local
regulations. Moreover, there could be no violation of the antitrust
laws because "[p]reempted state or local legislation is simply invalid
and unenforceable."'1
38
Since the Court reached its decision in Boulder, a number of cases
have shed some light on the matter. Yet, at present, there appears to
be no clear trend. Thus, in Pueblo the Tenth Circuit found that a
seemingly innocuous state statute satisfied the "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" arm of Boulder, as well as the "active super-
vision" prong, thereby giving to the city of Pueblo the antitrust ex-
emption of the state of Colorado.'39 In Affiliated Capital,'0 however,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the former mayor of Houston
liable for money damages for his role in a conspiracy resulting in a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'I' In Ron win v. State Bar
of Arizona,4 2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff
had the right to present evidence that a certain method of admitting
new bar licensees violated section 1 of the Sherman Act; despite that,
the court indicated it felt plaintiff's chances of proving his claim were
slim. 4 3 Thus, apparently there will be substantial disagreement among
the circuits as to the latitude to give to plaintiffs in pressing antitrust
claims against political subdivisions.
Cities must develop programs to prevent antitrust liability. A local
government should assess its operations, seeking to isolate those with
potential antitrust problems. Likewise, the city should identify those
officers and employees who may be involved in antitrust claims.
Municipal attorneys should create an antitrust compliance program for
the city, its officials, and its employees, calling attention to the poten-
tial problems and describing methods of avoiding those troubles. A
successful program will minimize exposure of political subdivisions to
Sherman Act scrutiny.
138. Id. at 69 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. Municipalities within the Tenth Circuit can take solace in the Pueblo holding. That cir-
cuit, at least, appears willing to give political subdivisions every benefit within the strictures of
Boulder.
140. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
142. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. By contrast to the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals apparently inter-
prets Boulder as necessitating more factual findings before allowing some type of pretrial
disposition.
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It is essential that municipal officers who may be involved in
antitrust claims base all actions and decisions on the enhancement of
the public health, safety, and welfare. As part of the overall antitrust
compliance program, cities should create a compliance documents pro-
gram, first detailing the circumstances in which documents must be
created, and then setting forth specific guidelines as to the retention
and destruction of particular documents. Once the compliance pro-
gram is in place, cities must be prepared to obey its mandates. Addi-
tionally, cities should continually audit their compliance, revising their
activities as needed.
Cities potentially face an ever-growing number of claims brought
pursuant to the Boulder doctrine. Whether they will also face serious
liability remains to be seen. In any event, Boulder will continue to play
an important role in future actions.
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